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The Nontaxation of
Nontestamentary Acts:
Will Byrum Survive the
Tax Reform Act of 1976?
John T. Gaubatz*
The author is of the view that notwithstanding the amendment to section 2036 of
the Internal Revenue Code included by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Byrum remains viable. By direct-
ing attention toward the result reached by the Court, the author discerns a disin-
clination on the part of the Court to include transferred property in the decedent's
gross estate unless the transfer was, upon an objective analysis, intended to take
effect at death. Support for such a posture is drawn from the authority cited by the
Court, the historical development of section 2036, and the judiciary's treatment of
similar cases.
iN LIGHT OF THE AMENDMENT to section 2036 of the Internal Revenue
Code included by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,1 further
*B.S. (1964), Colorado State University; J.D. (1967), University of Chicago. The author is
Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, and Visiting Professor, University of Miami Law School, 1976-77. He is admitted to the
Colorado and Federal Bars.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(a), 90 Stat. 1893 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 2036(a) (Supp.
197)).
Prior to the amendment, section 2036(a) provided:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent
of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
(except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or moneys worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or
for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from the
property, or
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discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Byrum 2
might seem unwarranted. 3 However, the language of the amendment is not
only ambiguous, 4 but also sufficiently narrow that skillful counsel may well
be able to avoid it.5 There remains, therefore, considerable room for judi-
cial interpretation of the applicability of section 2036 to transactions resem-
bling those in Byrum. The reasoning of that decision will undoubtedly be
influential in this interpretative process. Further analysis of Byrum is also
warranted by the fact that it illustrates the attitude of the Supreme Court
toward the estate tax. Indeed, the author is of the view that in the furor
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from.
Section 2009(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended this provision by appending the follow-
ing sentence: "For purposes of paragraph (1), the retention of voting rights in retained stock
shall be considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of such stock."
2. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
3. Byrum generated no fewer than thirty-five articles, notes, and comments prior to the
1976 Act, most of them critical. Aslanides, Supreme Court Rules on Grantors Retaining Certain
Rights over Property Transferred to Trust, 51 TAXES 157 (1973); Clark, Supreme Court Says
Grantor May Return Voting Control of Stock Placed in Trust, 37 J. TAx. 138 (1972); Covey,
The Byrum Case and Closely Held Stock: An Analysis, 3 TAx ADVISOR 644 (1972); Friedman,
Establishing Trusts With Controlled Corporation Stock: Tax Problems, 24 S. CAL. TAx INST.
409 (1972); Horvitz, Retention of Control: The Implication of the Byrum Case, 32 N.Y.U. INST.
FED. TAx. 235 (1974); Moore, Byrum Revisited, 27 S. CAL. TAx INST. 439 (1975); Newman &
Kalter, Transfers of Corporate Securities by Persons in Control of Corporate Policy, 111
TRUSTS & EST. 118 (1972); Newman & Kalter, Transfers of Corporate Securities by Persons in
Control of Corporate Policy: Byrum Revisited, 111 TRUSTS & EST. 710 (1972); Soled, Estate
Tax Consequence of Inter Vivos Transfers of Stock in a Closely-Held Corporation, 31 MD. L.
REV. 191 (1971); Spurgeon, Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations to Inter Vivos
Trusts, 22 TUL. TAx INST. 434 (1973); Comment, Application of Section 2036 to Inter Vivos
Transfers of Stock in Closely-Held Corporations, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1973); Note, Judi-
cial Limitation of Section 2036: The Byrum Doctrine, 61 CEO. L.J. 1087 (1973); Comment,
United States v. Byrum: The Troubled Application of 1.R.C. § 2036, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 498 (1973);
Comment, Section 2036 of the Federal Estate Tax and Inter Vivos Transfers in Trust of Stock
of Close Corporations, 9 WILLAMETTE L.J. 328 (1973); 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1091
(1973); 53 B.U.L. REv. 173 (1973); 50 DEN. L.J. 227 (1973); 58 IOWA L. REV. 354 (1972); 12 J.
FAM. L. 293 (1973); 33 LA. L. REv. 464 (1973); 19 Loy. L. REV. 485 (1973); 3 MEM. ST. U.L.
REV. 402 (1973); 24 MERCER L. REV. 957 (1973); 38 Mo. L. REV. 299 (1973); 51 N.C.L. REV.
325 (1972); 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 474 (1972); 26 Sw. L.J. 934 (1972); 50 TEX. L. REV. 1435
(1972); 46 TUL. L. REV. 1038 (1972): 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 950 (1972); 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 652
(1972); 1972 UTAH L. REv. 586; 8 VAL. L. REV. 156 (1973); 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97
(1973); 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 226 (1972).
4. The reference to "retained stock" is certainly peculiar. That it is a clerical error is
suggested by H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1222, 1365, wherein it appears that the conferees intended to
adopt the "transferred stock" terminology which appeared in H.R. 14844, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), even though that bill was not the one enacted.
5. Even assning the amendment applies to "transferred" stock, it does not address the
issue raised by Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 C.B. 269, where two classes of stock are used to
divorce control from economic value. Since the amendment covers only voting rights which are
retained with respect to transferred stock, it fails to resolve the question of whether nonvoting
shares which arc transferred should be included in the decedent's gross estate where he re-
tained control by means of voting shares. The author is of the view that the result in Byrum
signifies an authorization of this type of arrangement. See text accompanying notes 113-14 infra.
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over the reasoning of the Court in Byrum, the real significance of the case
has been lost. The principal significance of the decision is not found in its
technical reasoning but in its result-a result which evidences a bias against
including in the decedent's gross estate property which is the subject of a
transaction lacking in substance the underlying characteristic of
"testamentariness"-the ratio legis of section 2036.6
The facts of Byrum are well known to estate planners. Byrum, the con-
trolling shareholder in three closely held corporations, transferred a portion
of his stock holdings in each corporation to an irrevocable trust for the ben-
efit of his children. An independent corporation was appointed tiustee, but
Byrum retained the right to vote the shares, to veto their sale or transfer, to
veto any investment or reinvestment, and to remove the trustee and appoint
another corporation as successor. Byrum remained active in the three corpo-
rations following the transfer, apparently drawing a salary. Almost no di-
vidends were paid during his life, however. Thus, the stock generated only a
minimal amount of income for the trust.
Following Byrum's death, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in-
cluded the stock transferred into the trust in the decedent's gross estate on
the grounds that the strings retained by the settlor constituted retained in-
terests or rights within the meaning of section 2036 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Having paid the additional tax assessed, the estate sued for a refund
and prevailed in both the district court 7 and the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. 8 The Supreme Court affirmed.
It was the Commissioner's position throughout the litigation that the
power inherent in the rights retained by Byrum-to vote and veto sale or
transfer of the stock-enabled him to elect the three corporations' boards of
diiectors and thereby control not only the corporations' business affairs, in-
cluding his own employment and salary, but also their dividend policies.
The power to elect the boards of directors, the Commissioner argued, was a
retained right to enjoy the stock includable in the gross estate under section
2036(a)(1), while the power to control dividend policies was a right to desig-
nate the persons who could enjoy the income from the stock includable pur-
suant to section 2036(a)(2). The Court, however, rejected both of these con-
tentions. The right to designate the beneficiaries of the income was said not
to exist because Byrum's power to elect directors was not equivalent to a
retained right and'because their actions were limited by fiduciary obligations
imposed by corporate law. Enjoyment of the stock itself was not present for
the reason that "enjoyment" as used in the estate tax provisions con-
templated retention of a "substantial present economic benefit'" and because
6. See notes 15-63 infra and accompanying text.
7. Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
8. Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971).
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"control" was not a benefit transferred with the stock-the trust never
owned as much as fifty percent of the outstanding shares.
Comment regarding Byrum has been varied. A few have praised the de-
cision as an important concession to the small businessman 9 or as a
craftsmanlike use of judicial precedent. 10 Most, however, have been critical.
The most frequently raised objection is that the decision ignores the power
of a controlling shareholder to materially affect the salary levels of employees
and the declaration of dividends."i Adherents to this position find prepos-
terous the Court's assertion that state corporation law and Internal Revenue
Service supervision serve as an effective check upon such powers. Others
find in the Court's use of precedent a retreat to veneration of form over
substance.' 2 Congress rendered the ultimate objection to Byrum by amend-
ing section 2036(a)(1) to include transferred stock in the gross estate where
the voting rights to the stock are retained by the transferor.' 3
While the commentators' criticisms may be meritorious in the abstract and
the congressional response justifiable disagreement as to whether or not re-
tention of the particular "strings" ' 4 exhibited the requisite testamentariness,
Byrum remains a viable decision. If one cuts through the Court's discussion
of whether retained voting rights constitute a retained "right to designate"
under section 2036(a)(2) or a retained interest under section 2036(a)(1), there
emerges the almost irresistible conclusion that the Court did not perceive
the mere retention of voting control in a closely held corporation as indicat-
ing, upon an objective analysis, any particular desire to either retain income
to which the donor would not otherwise be entitled or to control the flow of
income to the holders of the beneficial interest in that stock, and that in
9. Cf. Newman & Kalter, Transfers of Corporate Securities by Persons in Control of Cor-
porate Policy, 111 TRUSTS & EST. 118 (1972) (reasoning of the majority opinion sound); 30
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (1973) (narrow construction given both 2036(a)(1) and 2036(a)(2) does
not constitute riskless mechanism for estate tax avoidance).
10. Cf. Comment, The Application of Section 2036 to Inter Vivos Transfers of Stock in
Closely-Held Corporations, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1973) (Court's analysis of section
2036(a)(2) implicity adopts the methodology of Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947),
State St. Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959), and Old Colony Trust Co. v.
United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970)); 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 950 (1972) (language and
interpretations of sections 2036(a)(1) and 2036(a)(2) support the Court's conclusions).
11. 19 Loy. L. REv. 485 (1973).
12. 46 TUL. L. REV. 1038 (1972); 1972 UTAH L. REV. 586.
The Court relied heavily upon the decision in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S.
339 (1929), in reaching its decision in Byrum. See text accompanying notes 20-25, 73-75 infra.
Objections to its use center primarily upon its date. Indeed, in 1929, the language now used in
section 2036(a) had not yet made its appearance in the Code. See notes 26-45 infra and accom-
panying text.
13. See note 1 supra.
14. "Strings" is used intentionally in order to avoid the definitional problem arising from the
fact that a voting right may be a retained power over income but not a right to control income.
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reality, the retention of such control is more likely to be the result of busi-
ness considerations. In other words, the decision recognizes that owners of
closely held businesses should not be forced to put their jobs on the line in
order to distribute by way of inter vivos gift the major asset of their
estate-their stock. '
Admittedly, there is little language in the opinion expressly supporting
such a hypothesis. Nevertheless the authority cited by the Court hints at the
conclusion suggested. The historical development of section 2036 offers
stronger support, as does the judiciary's handling of similar cases. Moreover,
the narrowness of the corrective amendment passed by Congress suggests
that the general approach of the Court may actually conform to current con-
gressional will.
I. READING INTENT BACK INTO THE CODE
The Supreme Court has often said that sections of the Internal Revenue
Code such as section 2036 were designed to include in the gross estate
property which is the subject of transactions basically testamentary in na-
ture. 16 In the past, this concept has been used principally as support for
decisions dealing with transfers not clearly covered by the Code. It is, how-
ever, capable of being a double-edged sword. Indeed, if testamentariness
can comprehend the taxation of transfers without a formal retention of "pow-
ers" because in substance "rights" are in fact retained, then it should also
comprehend the exclusion of transfers subject to retained "powers" which
are not sufficiently "testamentary" in substance to be called retained
"'rights." 17
That the foregoing represents the view of the Court in Byrum is
suggested by its otherwise inexplicable reliance upon the 1929 decision in
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.18 decided under statutory language de-
signed to tax transfers "intended to take effect .. .at . . .death." 19 Such
reliance can only suggest that the Court considers that statutory concept to
be a viable part of section 2036. The history of section 2036 and its compan-
ion provisions supports the accuracy of this general proposition. While it
reflects occasional congressional displeasure with particular Supreme Court
decisions, that history does not indicate that Congress meant "intent" to
disappear as a criterion for determining whether the subject of a transfer
should be included in the decedent's gross estate. Indeed, it suggests that
15. See Mathey v. United States, 491 F.2d 481, 489 (3d Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion).
16. E.g., United States v. Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 320 (1969); Commissioner v. Estate of
Church, 335 U.S. 632, 643 (1949); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112 (1940).
17. Sections 2036(a)(1) and 2036(a)(2) speak to "rights," not "powers." See note 1 supra.
18. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
19. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402(c), 42 Stat. 278.
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the language of section 2036 was actually developed in order to help clarify
this criterion, not to change it.
A. The Significance of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.
In responding to the Commissioner's argument that the rights retained
by Byrum constituted a right to designate the persons who would enjoy the
income from the property within the meaning of section 2036(a)(2), the
Court in Byrum invoked Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 20 as authority for
the proposition that the retention of broad managerial powers by a transferor
of property is not necessarily sufficient to require inclusion of the property
in the decedent's gross estate. The Court then noted that perhaps hundreds
of draftsmen of inter vivos trusts had relied on this holding, and that al-
though Byrum had not made himself trustee as was true of the settlor in
Northern Trust, the powers retained by him were essentially the
same. 21 Thus, it recognized that to hold for the Commissioner could result
in an unwarranted "serious adverse impact."' 22
As both the dissent in Byrum 23 and many commentators2 4 note, by rely-
ing upon Northern Trust .the Court attached little significance to congres-
sional amendments that had been enacted between the dates of the two
cases in an effort to reach transfers subject to retained rights or interests.
Even the majority in Byrum recognized this weakness. 25 It is this very
weakness, however, which forces one to suspect that there is more to Byrum
than appears on its surface. The Court did not have to .reach back for prece-
dent; the case could easily have been treated as a new problem under a new
statute. Yet in the eyes of the Court the problem in Byrum was governed by
the same principles as was Northern Trust. Since those principles could only
result from the then operative statutory provision, the Court's citation of
Northern Trust suggests that the requirements of that statute, including its
"intent" component, continue to have some viability under current law.
B. The History of Section 2036
Critics of the Byrum opinion have suggested that any powers retained by
a decedent which might be used for his own personal gain or to control the
20. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
21. The powers reserved by the settlor in Northern Trust were (a) to supervise reinvest-
ment of the trust funds; (b) to require the trustee to execute proxies running to the settlor's
nominee; (c) to vote the shares of stock held by the trustee; (d) to control all leases executed by
the trustee; (e) to appoint successor trustees; and (f) to modify the trust with the consent of the
beneficiary or beneficiaries of the trusts.
22. 408 U.S. at 134.
23. Id. at 164.
24. See note 12 supra.
25. 408 U.S. at 133-34.
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income payable under a trust should result in the inclusion of the trans-
ferred property in his gross estate under section 2036. This absolutist ap-
proach, however, denies the history of that section. Indeed, the pre-Byrum
history of section 2036 suggests that retained powers should cause trans-
ferred property to be included in the gross estate only where the decedent
lacked the intent to presently transfer its possession or enjoyment.
The history of section 2036 begins with the estate tax imposed by Con-
gress in 1916.26 That tax applied to probate property,2 7 jointly held prop-
erty,28 and prior transfers "with respect to which the decedent had created a
trust, in contemplation of, or intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after .his death. " 29 In Helvering v. Hallock30 the Supreme
Court later observed with respect to the 1926 draft of the statute 31 that the
emphasized language was intended to tax "not merely those interests which
are deemed to pass at death according to refined technicalities of the law of
property[, but] also . . . inter vivos transfers that are too much akin to tes-
tamentary dispositions not to be subjected to the same excise." 32
Notwithstanding general agreement with this fundamental purpose, the
uncertainty created by its simple language fostered repeated challenges
thereto, which, when coupled with Supreme Court hostility to the estate
tax, slowly forced congressional action to provide specifically for taxation of a
variety of testamentary transfers. Insurance was expressly included in the
gross estate in 1918,33 as were dower and curtesy interests 34 and property
passing pursuant to the exercise of general powers of appointment.3 5 Real
estate, an asset often not subject to claims,3 6 and therefore not part of the
probate estate, was included by the redraft of 1926. 37 Also included by the
26. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 777-80.
27. Id. § 202(a), 39 Stat. 777.
28. Id. § 202(c), 39 Stat. 778.
29. Id. § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777-78 (emphasis added).
30. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
31. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70.
32. 309 U.S. at 112.
33. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(o, 40 Stat. 1098. The Ways and Means Committee
Report notes that insurance was being used as a means of avoiding the 1916 Act. H.R. REP.
No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918).
34. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(b), 40 Stat. 1097. The Ways and Means Committee
Report indicates congressional surprise at the suggestion that such interests were not covered as
"interests" under the 1916 Act. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1918).
35. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(e), 40 Stat. 1097.
36. Cf. T. ArINsON, WIMLS § 123, at 670-71 (2d ed. 1953) (statutes do not ordinarily
authorize the sale of land in order to pay the decedent's debts unless there is a deficiency of
personalty).
37. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(a), 44 Stat. 70. The change was worked by deleting
the "subject to" language so that the emphasis of the statute became taxing the "'interest ... of
the decedent [in property] at the time of his death."
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1926 Act was property transferred subject to a power, held at death, to
"alter, amend, or revoke" the transfer. 38
In 1926, the "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after ... death" language was found in section 302(c).39 This language be-
came the subject of considerable controversy as a result of May v. Heiner40
and a series of related cases.4 1 In May, the Court held that the grantor's
reservation of a contingent life estate did not indicate that the remainder
was "intended to take effect ... at . . . his death." In the related cases, the
Court expanded this holding so that even where the decedent reserved an
outright life estate, the transfer was considered absolute, and therefore not
embraced by the operative language. These results, rejecting as they did not
only the common understanding of the phrase, 42 but also the Treasury's long
standing regulations,4 3 were so shocking that within a day of the decisions in
the May-related cases the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, was adopted by
Congress and signed by the President." This resolution amended section
302(c) by adding to the "intended to take effect... at ... death" language,
the phrase
including a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his
life or any period not ending before his death (1) the possession or
enjoyment of, or the income from, the property or (2) the right to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom.4 5
Notably, the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, did not remove "intent"
from the revenue laws, for it was still present in section 302(c). It merely
added specific language defining one of the types of transfers to be included
under that general language. "Intent" remained as the basic criterion of in-
cludability.
Because the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, forms the substance of
section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, its subsequent history
38. Id. § 302(d), 44 Stat. 71. The Ways and Means Committee Report indicates a belief that
with the fall of this retained power "the substantial interest which he had has been wiped out,
and to the same extent the property interest of the legal title holder, his transferee, has been
increased." H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1932).
39. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70.
40. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
41. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931) (per curiam); Morsman v. Burnet,
283 1J.S. 783 (1931) (per curiam); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931) (per curiam).
42. The consensus on this point is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision in May in a one sentence per curiam
opinion. 32 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1929), aff'g per curiam, 25 F.2d 1004 (W.D. Pa. 1928).
43. Treas. Reg. 37, art. 24, T.D. 2910, TREAs. DEC. Irr. REv. 771 (1919).
44. Pub. Res. No. 131, ch. 454, 46 Stat. 1516-17 (1931).
45. Id.
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is of extreme importance. In Hassett v. Welch,4 6 the Court held the effect of
the resolution to be prospective only, not applying to transfers made before
its enactment by decedents who died thereafter. This led to a renewal of
questions concerning the applicability of the May decision, which were're-
solved when the Court overruled the decision in Commissioner v. Estate of
Church.47 The Court recognized that the sole purpose behind the resolution
was to reverse the Court's interpretation of the "intended to take effect...
at ... death" clause in May.
It is strongly urged that we continue to regard May v. Heiner as
controlling and leave its final repudiation to Congress. Little effort
is made to defend the May v. Heiner interpretation of "possession
or enjoyment" on the ground that it truly reflects the congressional
purpose, nor do we think it possible to attribute such a purpose to
Congress. There is no persuasive argnment, if any at all, that trusts
reserving life estates with remainders over at grantors' deaths are
not satisfactory and effective substitutes for wills. 48
This was nothing more than recognition of the obvious. The letter from
the Secretary of the Treasury which precipitated the resolution made
specific reference to May and its companion decisions, and deplored the
results.4 9 Moreover, the speed with which Congress reacted clearly re-
flected a desire to overcome an immediate problem. And although no con-
gressional report accompanied the resolution, congressional intent was later
expressed when clarifying language was added by the Revenue Act of
1932.50
The purpose of this amendment to section 302(c) of the Revenue
Act of 1926 is to clarify in certain respects the amendments made
to that section by the joint resolution of March 3, 1931, which
were adopted to render taxable a transfer under which the dece-
dent reserved the income for his life. The joint resolution was de-
signed to avoid the effect of decisions of the Supreme Court hold-
46. 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
47. 335 U.S. 632 (1949). Church was itself made inapplicable to transfers prior to March 4.
1931, in the case of decedents dying prior to January 1, 1950, by the Technical Changes Act,
ch. 720, § 7(b), 63 Stat. 895-96, (1949), amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 811(c), 53
Stat. 121. Although the decision accurately reflected the substantive purpose of the Joint Reso-
lution of March 3, 1931, Congress felt that it was unfair in its retroactive application.
48. 335 U.S. at 646.
49. 74 CONC. REc. 7198-99 (1931).
50. Ch. 209, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 279-80 (1932). Inserted into section 302(c) of the Revenue Act
of 1926, as amended by the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, were these phrases: "or for any
period not ascertainable without reference to [the decedent's] death;" "or for any period which
does not in fact end before his death;" "the right to the income;" and "'either alone or in
conjunction with any person."
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ing such a transfer not taxable if irrevocable and not made in con-
templation of death. 5 1
Aside from the clarifying language added by the Revenue Act of 1932,
section 302(c) as modified by the Joint Resolution was codified with minor
changes as section 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.52 The legis-
lative history discloses no intent to change the coverage of the provision.
Both the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Commit-
tee Reports which accompanied the legislation speak strictly in terms of con-
solidation and codification of the then existing laws. 5 3
In 1949, the Technical Changes Act gave the language added by
the Joint Resolution in 1931 its own section, 811(c)(1)(B), and moved
the "intended to take effect . . . at . . . death" language to section
811(c)(1)(C). 54 However, the Conference Report to the Technical Changes
Act indicates no intention to alter the coverage of the section: "Paragraph (1)
[811(c)(1)] merely states the existing general rule .... ."55Thus, to the ex-
tent that section 811(c)(1)(B) contained an implied limitation from the prece-
dents decided under the "intended to take effect .. . at . . . death" lan-
guage, that limitation apparently remained.
When Congress enacted section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 it deleted the "intended to take effect ... at . . .death" language of
section 811(c)(1)(C) while retaining section 811(c)(1)(B) virtually without
change. The argument can therefore be made that Congress meant for "in-
tent" to disappear as a criterion for determining whether transferred prop-
erty should be included or excluded from the gross estate. However, it is
once again difficult to find such a purpose in the legislative history. The
Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1954 Code not only indicates that
no substantive changes were intended by the adoption of section 2036,56 but
51. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1932).
52. Ch. 1, § 811(c), 53 Stat. 121 (1939).
53. H.R. REP. No. 6, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939); S. REP. No. 20, 76th Cong., ist Sess.
1 (1939).
54. Ch. 720, § 7(a), 63 Stat. 894-95. Amended section 811(c) thus read:
(1) GENERAL RULE.- To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise-
(B) under which he has retained for his life or forany period not ascertaina-
ble without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or (ii) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom; or
(C) intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death.
55. CONF. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1949] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2183, 2189.
56. "This section [2036] except for clerical changes, corresponds to section 811(c)(1)(B) of the
1939 Code, as amended. No substantive change has been made." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
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also that Congress considered the "intent" language of section 811(c)(1)(C) to
be embodied in the consolidation of that section with sections 811(c)(2) and
811(c)(3) worked by Code section 2037. 5
In order to appreciate fully the significance of section 2037 it is necessary
to take note of the Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Spiegel v. Commis-
sioner.5 8 Two of the sections-of the 1939 Code consolidated by section
2037-811(c)(2) and 811(c)(3)-were added in 1949 by the Technical Changes
Act in order to correct the absolutist approach taken by the Court therein.
In Spiegel, the Court held that a transfer pursuant to which the decedent
failed to give away a reversion contingent upon his having to survive both
his children and grandchildren was covered by 811(c)(1)(C). In support of
this decision the Court cited, as it had in Commissioner v. Estate of
Church,59 its decision in Helvering v. Hallock,60 stating: "After such a trans-
fer has been made, the settlor must be left with no present legal title in the
property, no possible reversionary interest in that title, and no right to pos-
sess or to enjoy the property then or thereafter. '" 6 ' Section 811(c)(2) re-
sponded to the Court's conclusion in Spiegel by limiting section 811(c)(1)(C)'s
coverage of reversionary interests to those with a value in excess of five
percent of the value of the property.6 2 By this action Congress rejected a
rigid approach to the inclusionary reach of the "intended to take effect ...
at ... death" language just as firmly as it had rejected May's rigid approach
to exclusion in the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931. In other words, just as
Congress established by its resolution in 1931 that property concepts were
not to be used as an absolute standard for exclusion from coverage, so it
established by the 1949 Act that those same concepts were not to be used as
an absolute standard for inclusion. Rather, transferred property was to be
included only where the reservation of a reversionary interest illustrated tes-
tamentary intent by virtue of its size.
2d Sess. 469, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 5113. Therefore, to the
extent that the language in section 811(c)(1)(B) carried with it an implied limitation from the
"intended to take effect . .. at . .. death" language formerly associated therewith, that limita-
tion carried over into section 2036. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
57. "This section [2037] is a combination and revision of existing law found in sections
811(c)(1)(C), 811(c)(2), and 811(c)(3) of the 1939 Code. This section corresponds to provisions of
existing law insofar as they relate to transfers of property made prior to October 8, 1949." S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 469, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4621, 5113.
58. 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
59. 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
60. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
61. 335 U.S. at 705.
62. Ch. 720, § 7(a), 63 Stat. 894-95 (1949). Coverage of section 811(c)(2) was limited to
transfers made prior to October 8, 1949. Coverage of transfers made after October 7, 1949, was
governed by section 811(c)(3). It was restricted to those transfers which required the grantee to
survive the grantor-a condition expressed by the Court in Spiegel.
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With this history as background, the consolidation worked by section
2037 in 1954 no longer appears as an attempt to rid the Code of an "intent"
criterion. As a result of the Technical Changes Act, nonincome reversions
were essentially all that was left to be covered by the "intended to take
effect . . . at . . . death" language in section 811(c)(1)(C). Reversionary in-
terests in income created prior to October 8, 1949, were expressly excluded
from section 811(c)(1)(C) by section 811(c)(2) while reserved life estates were
implicitly excluded because of the express inclusion called for by section
811(c)(1)(B). Thus, combination of 811(c)(1)(C), 811(c)(2), and 811(c)(3) into a
single "reverter" section was logical.
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that the goal of section 2036 re-
mains much the same as that of the original section 302(c) as amended in
response to May and as transmuted through section 811(c)-to tax those
transfers of property "intended to take effect .. .at . . .death" that are in
the form of life estates. In substance, it does little more than illustrate the
type of transfers which are taxable simply because, in the words of the Court
in Hallock, they are "too much akin to testamentary dispositions not to be
subjected to the same excise." 63
This practical reading of section 2036 is reinforced by section 2038. Sec-
tion 2038 requires inclusion of property in the gross estate where its posses-
sion and enjoyment are subject to change through the exercise of a retained
"power (in whatever capacity exercisable) ... to alter, amend, revoke, or
terminate" the transfer. Section 2036, on the other hand, speaks only in
terms of "rights"-an assumedly narrower standard of coverage-and lacks
the parenthetical modifier found in section 2038. The familiar principle of
statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, would therefore
suggest that Congress did not intend section 2036 to cover rights retained in
certain capacities.64
Section 2038 suggests a practical reading of section 2036 in other ways.
By its terms, section 2038 will tax those transfers subject only to the trans-
feror's power to modify. Where one retains only this power, he retains
power without clear economic gain. Taxation must therefore be premised
upon the testamentary intent exhibited. 65 The fact that Congress chose to
tax only those interests in the transferred property which are subject to the
63. 309 U.S. at 112.
64. This does not mean that by mere change in capacity one can avoid the application of
section 2036. Such a result would be troubling, to say the least. One can, however, draw from
the lack of capacity language the absence of an intent to make 2036 a section covering abso-
lutely all retained powers or even rights. Byrum reflects such a less than absolute approach, and
therefore seems consistent with congressional intent. But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3)
(1958).
65. The question is obviously quite different from that of determining whether a transaction
is "testamentary" under the Statute of Wills. See T. AnraNsoN, supra note 36, at §§ 38-49.
There, the question is one of legal form-clearly not the question here.
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proscribed powers under section 2038 also indicates that its purpose was to
cover only those powers which made the transfer of property subject thereto
indicative of testamentary intent. Thus, section 2038 does indeed reinforce
the proposition of the Court in Hallock that the thrust of the estate tax
provisions is to tax only those transactions which are basically testamentary
in nature.
II. RETAINED POWERs As NONTESTAMENTARY
AcTs 6
6
In addition to helping expose testamentary intent as the root criterion for
taxation under section 2036, Byrum underscores the fact that when viewed
in light of objective circumstances many powers retained by donors of prop-
erty have as their most likely genesis a purpose which is nontestamentary.
That Congress seems also to have recognized this fact may be inferred from
the narrow manner in which it responded to the decision. Instead of attack-
ing the right versus power distinction raised by the Court in its analysis of
section 2036(a)(2), Congress reversed the decision by providing that for the
purposes of section 2036(a)(1) "the retention of voting rights in [transferred]
stock shall be considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of such
stock." 6 7 While it was unnecessary for Congress to go further than this in
order to reverse Byrum, its failure to close the potential gap in the coverage
of section 2036(a)(2) created by the right-power distinction 68 suggests that it
(and perhaps the Internal Revenue Service as well) does not perceive the
decision as being out of line with the purposes of that section.
In its analysis of the applicability of section 2036(a)(2), the Court in
Byrum recognized that just as a trustee's activities are limited by the
fiduciary duties imposed by trust law, so too are the activities of a majority
shareholder and board of directors limited by the fiduciary obligations im-
posed by state corporation law. It did so in order to help support an analogy
between the facts presented and those in several cases wherein it was held
that broad management powers held by a donor-trustee will not cause the
transferred property. to be included in the decedent's gross estate. 69 This
controlling shareholder to donor-trustee analogy is not unreasonable, al-
though some have disagreed with it. 7 0 In each situation the decedent's re-
tention of powers does not normally suggest a testamentary purpose: control-
66. The phrase is mine, borrowed from a similar doctrine in the law of decedents' estates.
See generally T. ATxINsoN, supra note 36, at § 81.
67. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 § 2009(a), 90 Stat. 1893 (codified at 26
U.S.C.A. § 2036(a) (Supp. 1977)).
68. See notes 94-107 infra and accompanying text.
69. 408 U.S. at 133-34, 141-43.
70. See, e.g., 19 LoY. L. REv. 485 (1973).
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ling shareholders of family businesses may wish to continue in control in
order to achieve an employment-related goal or to preserve their status in
the family rather than to effect a wealth transfer;7 ' donors, often the most
logical trustees, need a broad range of powers in order to operate their
trusts efficiently. 72
A. Retention of Powers by Donor-Trustees
Citation by the Court in Byrum 73 of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 
74
suggests that the Court still does not perceive the retention of "manage-
ment" powers which may be used to "designate the persons who shall pos-
sess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom" 75 as ipso facto estab-
lishing a testamentary intention. This is understandable. A donor-trustee
may desire management control over transferred property in order to benefit
all of the trust's beneficiaries rather than to harm one or more of them.
Indeed, such would be the normal case for retaining such powers. Their
presence in the hands of a donor-trustee is therefore at worst neutral evi-
dence of testarmentary intent.
The same can be said of retained "administrative" powers. 76 These pow-
ers can easily be used by a donor-trustee to enhance income at the expense
of principal or principal at the expense of income.7 7 Yet in the leading case
of Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States 78 the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that no cumulation of purely administrative powers violated the
constraints of section 2036. The court found "it difficult to see how a power
can be subject to control by the probate court, and exercisable only in what
the trustee fairly concludes is in the interests of the trust and its beneficiar-
ies as a whole, and at the same time be an ownership power." 79
Any realist must admit that if a trustee desires to maximize the interest
of one beneficiary to the detriment of another the significant latitude permit-
ted him in exercising his administrative powers will enable him to do so.
The realist will also recognize that family members are unlikely to enforce
the equitable duties constraining a donor-trustee--particularly where further
71. See notes 81-87 infra and accompanying text; Horvitz, Retention of Control: The Impli-
cation of the Byrum Case, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 235, 242, 244-45 (1974) (buy-a-job
theory for taxation under section 2036(a)(1), see note 85 infra).
72. See text accompanying notes 73-79 infra.
73. 408 U.S. at 133-34, 146-47.
74. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).75. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2).
76. Examples of such powers are those which permit the trustee to determine whether trust
receipts shall be allocated to principal or income and to make investments not normally allowed
other trustees.
77. State St. Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635, 639 (1st Cir. 1959).
78. 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
79. Id. at 603.
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assets remain to be distributed. Because of the clear possibility for abuse,
Old Colony and cases like it suggest that courts do not feel that the average
donor-trustee will exercise retained powers so as to harm one or more of the
trust's beneficiaries. Rather, the perception seems to be that such powers
are retained in order to help the donor-trustee maximize the profitability
and security of the trust and are, in general, neutral with respect to their
intended effect on beneficiaries. If such perceptions are true, the donor does
not, practically speaking, retain a right to designate who shall receive pos-
session, enjoyment, or income since he does not reserve the powers with
the purpose of varying the interests of the beneficiaries. The retention of
powers in and of itself should therefore not be a sufficient reason for includ-
ing the transferred property in the donor-trustee's gross estate; it is, in ef-
fect, a nontestamentary act.
B. Byrum
If testamentary intent is to be ascertained, as suggested in Commissioner
v. Estate of Church,80 by inquiring into whether or not a particular power
would, in the normal case, be retained in order to be exercised against the
interest of a beneficiary, it is important to recognize that there were signifi-
cant reasons for the powers Byrum retained which stemmed from sources
other than antibeneficiary intent. For example, because the trustee to which
Byrum transferred his stock was a third party, there arose a possibility for
significant outside influence in what were basically family businesses. 8' In
such a situation the natural reaction of the "owner" is to try to protect them.
The easiest manner in which to do this is that which was used by Byrum-
prohibit sale of the shares and retain the voting rights.
If the prohibition on retention of powers is perceived as being directed
against the trustee, the property should not be included in the gross estate
under section 2036(a)(2). This section is directed only against those rights
which affect beneficial interests-possession, enjoyment, or income. 82 Be-
80. 335 U.S. 632, 641 (1949). The Court in Church cited with approval Reish v. Common-
wealth, 106 Pa. 521 (1884), for its holding that "the test of'intended' was not a subjective one,
that the question was not what the parties intended to do, but what the transaction actually
effected as to title, possession and enjoyment." 335 U.S. at 638. This interpretation reflects the
"objective factual" test preferred by Surrey & Aronson, Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal
Estate Tax, 32 CoL m. L. REv. 1332, 1337-40 (1932).
81. While there were other "outside" shareholders prior to the transfer into trust, Byrum
owned a vast majority of shares in each of the companies. See 408 U.S. at 130 n.2.
82. Coverage of section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 70, one of
section 2036's many predecessors, was early recognized as applying to a "shifting of the
economic benefits." Surrey & Aronson, supra note 80, at 1344. Byrum notes the same thrust
through its endorsement of the interpretation given the word "enjoyment" in Commissioner v.
Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 486 (1946), that is, power over a "substantial present economic
benefit." 408 U.S. at 145.
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cause the trustee is entitled to none of these, powers that are designed to
restrain him should not violate the section. In terms of "intent:" if the pow-
ers were retained with antitrustee intent, they were not retained with tes-
tamentary motives and therefore do not indicate that the transfer of the
beneficial interest was "intended to take effect ... at ...death."
It is true that the powers retained by Byrum could have been used to the
detriment of the income beneficiaries. The fact that it would have been pos-
sible for him to grant the voting and veto powers to one or more of them
seems to support the conclusion that the retained powers were intended to
be so used. On the other hand, it must be recognized that closely held stock
has value not only as an item of economic wealth but also as a formal pre-
requisite to the control of a business. Indeed, there are several good busi-
ness reasons for the key man in a closely held corporation to have the voting
rights to its stock. Two of the most obvious are to enable him to influence
corporate expansion through accumulation of earnings and to give him the
ability to retain needed personnel by increasing their salaries. a Without the
capacity to make these types of decisions the entrepreneur is unlikely to be
successful in running his business. 4 This suggests that in the normal case
the retention of voting power over stock in a closely held corporation which
is transferred in trust by a key figure in the company's operations may be
motivated at least as much by business reasons as it is by a purpose to
control the flow of economic benefits to the beneficiaries. It is, in other
words, as much an indication of a nontestamentary purpose as it is of a
testamentary one. 85
The family head's natural inclination to protect his position as such also
suggests a nontestamentary purpose in retaining control over transferred
stock. Indeed, had Byrum given the voting rights to his children he would
have effectively reversed the normal operation of the family; his position, his
duties, and his salary would all have been subject to their control. 86 It is
83. See 408 U.S. at 139-42.
84. Indeed, the security of continued business control may be one of the primary reasons
for issuing nonvoting stock as a means of raising capital. E. DONALDSON & J. PFAHL, CoRuo-
RATE FINANCE 732 (3d ed. 1969).
85. One commentator refers to retention of voting control as the "buy-a-job" power. Hor-
vitz, supra note 71, at 235, 242, 244-45 (1974). Under this view retention of voting control
enables the holder to "enjoy" the stock under section 2036(a)(1) because he is able to insure his
employment and the salary which goes with it. The Court in Byrum rejected this argument,
and rightly so, for a "buy-a-job" motive is but another phrasing of the reason for not holding the
transaction testamentary. Nevertheless, the amendment to section 2036(a)(1) included by Con-
gress in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 appears to accept the theory that the ability to "buy-a-job"
is sufficient to justify taxation.
86. The trust assets included a 48% ownership interest in one corporation and a 46%
interest in another. Byrum retained only 35 and 42% interests respectively. 408 U.S. at 130 n.2. The
beneficiaries would thus have been in a fairly dominant position.
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unlikely that a parent would want to be subject to such control by his chil-
dren. It is therefore entirely possible to perceive the retention of control by
Byrum as being motivated by a desire to retain parental supremacy rather
than to retain the right to designate the persons who were to enjoy the
economic benefits of the stock. If this perception is true it cannot be argued
that section 2036(a)(2) is applicable. Preserving parental status is not the sort
of intent against which the section is directed.8 7
C. The Family Home Cases
The Byrum result is also consistent with the manner in which the courts
have applied section 2036(a)(1) to the decedent who remained in possession
of a home that he transferred to his spouse or children. In these cases the
principal question is generally whether or not the transfer was made pur-
suant to an implied agreement whereby the decedent retained a right to
.possess or enjoy the property. Such an inference is an easy one to draw.
Nevertheless, courts have been wary of applying section 2036(a)(1), and in
fact, have consistently refused to find the requisite agreement where the
transfer has been from one spouse to another.8 8 On the other hand, it now
appears likely that an agreement giving the donor a right to possess and
enjoy the property will be implied where the donor and donee are parent
and child.8 9
The reasons for the distinction between spousal and parental transfers are
not readily discernable. In both instances the parties assume that the donor
will continue to occupy the premises after the transfer and in both instances
the donor does in fact continue to do so. It is submitted that the cases can
only be understood by comparing the transfers to those in the ordinary
course of an ordinary family's life.
The nature of marriage is such that common use of individually owned
assets is expected. As a result, gifts made within the context of a normal
marriage presuppose that the donor will retain a contirfued benefit. Because
the transfer of the family home is no different in this respect, the testamen-
tary intent necessary for taxation cannot be implied. In the parent-child con-
text, however, retention of title until transfer of possession would appear to
be the norm. Indeed, it is unusual for a parent to transfer his or her house
87. The distinction being made here between a retention of family property and a retention
of family status may make a reference to Roman law appropriate. See generally H. MAINE,
ANcIENT Lw 172-84 (3d ed. 1873).
88. E.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 361 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1966); Estate
of Binkley v. United States, 358 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1966); Allen D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554
(1966), acquiesced in, 1967-1 C.B. 2.
89. E.g., Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1971); Estate of Emil Linderme,
Sr., 52 T.C. 305 (1969); Rev. Rul. 70-155, 1970-1 C.B. 189.
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before the need for it ceases. Earlier transfer with continued possession thus
raises the inference that the transfer is in fact subject to a right to possess.
That the distinguishing factor between the spousal and parental transfer
cases is the regularity of the transaction within the context of a normal fam-
ily structure is confirmed by the decision in Diehl v. United States.90 In
Diehl, the court found that a transfer by an aged father to his son after the
latter and his wife had sold their own home and moved in so as to be able to
take care of him was not made pursuant to an implied agreement giving the
father a right to stay, notwithstanding any assumption the parties may have
had, and thus held that section 2036(a)(1) did not apply. Because a parental
transfer was involved, one would have expected the Commissioner to have
won this case. However, the transfer in Diehl was made to a party who at
the time of the transfer was making the home his permanent residence.
Thus, continued occupation of the home by the father was as consistent with
an absolute gift of his entire interest as it was with a retained life estate, and
because either was possible, no presumption of an agreement justifying in-
clusion of the property in the gross estate could be made. In other words,
the regularity of the transaction when compared with an objective view of
the circumstances indicated that the transfer was a nontestamentary act.
III. LOOKING AHEAD
Presuming Byrum does in fact endorse testamentariness as the standard
to be applied in evaluating transfers arguably within the scope of section
2036, the case suggests results for a variety of situations with which the
courts are presently struggling.
A. The Family Home Cases
The most obvious effect of reading Byrum as embracing a testamentari-
ness test would be affirmation of the manner in which the family home cases
are presently being resolved. Because continued residence by a donor-
spouse is consistent with an absolute transfer of a house within the marriage
context, it should not, on that basis alone, be included in the donor's estate.
Similarly, where both the donor and donee reside in the house prior to the
transfer, continued occupancy should not result in inclusion--even where
the donor-donee relationship is one of parent and child.91
On the other hand, an express agreement between spouses for continued
residence until sale of the house or dissolution of the marriage by death or
otherwise would seem to violate section 2036(a)(1) even though such an
90. 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,506 (W.D. Tenn. 1967).
91. Of course, if the child were a minor, one might find sufficient irregularity to raise the
issue of testamentary intent based upon the control which a parent exercises over his child.
[Vol. 27:623
TAXATION OF NONTESTAMENTARY ACTS
agreement would be but a restatement of expected behavior, because the
very existence of the agreement indicates a posture of negotiation-a posture
contrary to the normal marriage relation. 92 Certainly, if the agreement for
continued occupancy extends beyond sale of the house or divorce, section
2036(a)(1) should cause the house to be included in the donor's gross estate
because it would clearly exceed the normal expectations as to ownership by
the donee.9 3
B. implied Rights
Although Byrum may protect some implied agreements (such as the fam-
ily home cases) from automatically running afoul of section 2036, there
seems no reason to assume that it will protect all of them. At best, the case
dictates a presumption against inclusion if the acts are as consistent with a
nontestamentary purpose as with a testamentary one. Nowhere in Byrum is
it suggested that a retained "power" cannot constitute a retained "right"
covered by 2036 where that power is in fact used to the detriment of a
donee. 94 Indeed, since post-retention use may provide the best evidence of
intent at the time of the transfer, such cases should reach results opposite
that in Byrum.95
An example of such a case is Estate of Hilton W. Goodwyn.96 There,
notwithstanding a "friendly trustee" who consistently followed the requests
of the donor in exercising his discretionary powers, the Tax Court held that
Byrum prohibited including the transferred property in the decedent's gross
estate. Such a reading of Byrum seems unwarranted. Nothing in the lan-
guage of section 2036 requires an express reservation of rights, and since
92. In the normal case it is arguable that there is no retention as required by the statute,
but merely a permitted use. On the other hand, where the parties enter into an agreement the
fact of retention is clear.
93. Indeed, there is little question that continued possession would be adverse to that of the
purchaser, in the case of a sale, and to the former spouse, in the case of divorce.
94. It is noteworthy that although only minimal dividends were paid during Byrum's tenure
there was no proof that this was inconsistent with prior company policy or otherwise the result
of an effort by Byrum to control the flow of dividends to the trust.
95. Cf. Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975) (transfer of stock into trust
in exchange for annuity deemed a transfer with a reserved life estate in income rather than a
sale); Estate of William duPont, Jr., 63 T.C. 746 (1975) (conveyance of bulk of residential and
recreational estate to wholly owned corporation and transfer of its shares to irrevocable trust not
a bona fide arm's length transaction divesting the grantor of possession or enjoyment where he
leased back the property for less than adequate consideration for a period of ten years with an
option to renew), noted in 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 258 (1976); Mark Bixby, 58 T.C. 757 (1972)
(trust interposed in transaction between buyer and seller deemed a sham transaction); Estate of
Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modfied 1 T.C. 564 (1943) (stock transferred during
life of decedent accompanied by immediate retransfer as "security" included in decedents gross
estate). See also 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 97 (1973).
96. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 740 (1973).
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early in the section's history the regulations have clearly stated that it
applies to rights either "express or implied." 9 The clear intent of this regu-
lation is to prohibit avoidance of section 2036 by means of a paper transac-
tion whereby property that is the subject of a seemingly outright transfer
remains subject to the donor's life estate or control. In such cases the inabil-
ity to obtain evidence of an express agreement ought not stand in the way of
taxation. 98
This conclusion is supported by several persuasive pre-Byrum decisions.
In Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner,9 9 for example, a parent-grantor re-
served for his life the rents from transferred property pursuant to oral
agreements with the children-grantees. The estate argued that the retained
income interest was not a "right" because the statute of frauds could pre-
clude judicial enforcement of the agreements from which it arose, and that
even if it were a right, it was not includable because it was not retained
"under" the transfer to the children. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
noted, however, that the "right to income" clause of section 811(c)(1)(B) of
the 1939 Code, the predecessor to section 2036, was not intended by Con-
gress to circumscribe the "possession or enjoyment" clause, but was instead
meant to broaden its sweep by making clear its coverage of those cases
where a decedent who was not receiving income was in fact entitled to do
so. 100 In so doing it rejected the notion that "possession or enjoyment" con-
templated an enforceable claim against the transferee. And with respect to
the taxpayer's technical argument that a retained life interest must be "un-
der" the original transfer the court simply stated that "[t]his [was] too con-
stricted an interpretation to place on the statute. The statute means only
that the life interest must be retained in connection with or as an incident to
the transfer." 101
A similar and more recent case of like import is Estate of McCabe v.
United States. 02 There, the decedent had transferred stock to a trust for his
wife with a remainder to his children. On several occasions following the
creation of the trust and until the decedent's death, he prepared requests for
distributions of corpus which were readily signed by his wife who admitted
that she could not recall ever having seen the trust agreement or having its
terms explained to her. Most of the withdrawn funds were deposited by the
trustee in the decedent's checking account, and in one instance were used to
pay off his personal note. Not surprisingly, the court found that this "pre-
97. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a)(ii) (1958) (last sentence).
98. This is especially true where the creation of the evidence is within the control of the
decedent.
99. 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
100. Id. at 670-71.
101. Id. at 670.
102. 475 F.2d 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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tended transfer to a wife, with the retention of a life estate by the husband
so apparent from the facts as here, is the archetypal situation reached by
subdivision (1) of § 2036(a)."1 0 3
The McCabe situation is nearly identical to that in Goodwyn. In both
instances a party occupying what should have been an independent or ad-
verse position was willing to do as the decedent requested. The result
reached in McCabe, recognizing as it does the realities of the situation,
seems certainly to be preferred. Actually, this result may be mandated by
the decision in United States v. Estate of Grace 104 wherein the Supreme
Court recognized the concept of implied rights in reaching the conclusion
that reciprocal trusts must be included in the gross estate under section
811(c)(1)(B) of the 1939 Code.' 0 5 The Court observed that "[t]he general
purpose of the statute was to include in a decedent's gross estate transfers
that are essentially testamentary-i.e., transfers which leave the transferor a
significant interest in or control over the property transferred during his
lifetime," ' 06 and concluded not only that the reciprocal trust doctrine should
be recognized, but also that a finding of reciprocity did not depend "upon a
finding that each trust was created as a quid pro quo for the other."' 0 7 This
analysis seems to recognize that which the Tax Court in Goodwyn believed
to be precluded by Byrum-the demonstration of an implied retention of
right. Yet nowhere in Byrum is Grace invalidated. Indeed, the Byrum deci-
sion went no further than to find that the powers there retained were insuf-
ficient to show the retention of such a right. In clearer cases one would
expect to reach different results. This being true, McCabe and McNichol
should have controlled the decision in Goodwyn.
C. Term Trusts
Section 2036 extends to transfers subject to retained rights or interests
which last "for [a] period which does not in fact end before [the decedent's]
death." This language appears to be without exception. However, the his-
tory of section 2036 suggests that the quoted language was intended only to
cover those cases in which a term was used as a substitute for a retention for
life. Indeed, the Senate Finance Committee Report explaining the addition
of the specific language in 1932 stated:
The insertion of the words "or for any period which does not in
fact end before his death" . . . is to reach, for example, a transfer
103. Id. at 1148.
104. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
105. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 811(c)(1)(B), 63 Stat. 894-95 (now I.R.C. § 2036(a)).
106. 395 U.S. at 320.
107. Id. at 324.
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where decedent, 70 years old, reserves the income for an extended
term of years and dies during the term, or where he is to have the
income from and after the death of another person until his own
death, and such other person predeceases him.1 0 8
Moreover, when Congress passed the 1954 Code, it stated in the Senate
Finance Committee Report that section 2036 represented section 811(c)(1)(B)
of the 1939 Code except for clerical changes. 109 The regulations under that
section had limited its coverage to interests "for a period as would evidence
[the decedent's] intention that it should extend at least for the duration of
his life." 1 10 Arguably, therefore, Congress endorsed the then current regu-
lations as accurately defining the scope of section 2036.111
The foregoing suggests that a strong argument can be made that short
term trusts created by young donors were never contemplated as being
within the coverage of section 2036. Byrum adds support to this conclusion
through its recognition of the more basic proposition-that section 2036 is
meant to cover only those transfers that are "intended to take effect ... at
... death." Short term trusts created by young donors would seem not to
be so intended on any objective standard, and should therefore be excluded
from its coverage.1 1 2
D. The Family Business
Since Byrum dealt specifically with control of a closely held business, it
would appear to have its most significant impact in that area. While reten-
tion of voting rights has been precluded by the amendment to section
2036,113 Byrum appears to authorize the type of transaction disapproved of
in Revenue Ruling 67-54 114 whereby the owner retains control of his busi-
ness by retaining the company's voting stock while transferring to others
108. S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., .1st Sess. 50 (1932).
109. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 469, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 5113.
110. Treas. Reg. 81, § 81.18(a)(1) (1939).
111. See Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
112. The current regulations do not address the problem, and so far the cases seem to have
avoided directly confronting the issue. See, e.g., Bayliss v. United States, 326 F.2d 458 (4th
Cir. 1964); Estate of Edson Bradley, 9 T.C. 145 (1947). Shukert v. Allen, 300 F. 754 (D. Neb.
1924), aff'd, 6 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1925), reo'd, 273 U.S. 545 (1927), provides an illustration of
the classic case for inclusion. There, a trust for a term of thirty years was established by a
gentleman with a life expectancy of only sixteen or seventeen years. See also Treas. Reg. §
20.2037-1(e) Ex. 5 (1958).
113. See notes 1, 4-5 supra.
114. 1967-1 C.B. 269. In rejecting the rationale of this ruling Byrum is in accord with Yeazel
v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (power to vote stock of family
corporation as trustee and as individual and to manage the trust, including the power to sell and
invest the trust property for the best interests of the beneficiaries, deemed not to constitute a
retained interest in or right to govern the beneficiaries' enjoyment of the property and thus
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nonvoting shares representing the economic incidents of ownership. Such a
plan can be justified on the basis of management retention motives and
would thus seem permissible under Byrum. Furthermore, because voting
rights are not retained with respect to the transferred stock, such an ar-
ragement may even survive the amendment to section 2036 included in the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Of greater difficulty is a case such as Estate of Charles Gilman,115 where
corporate control rested in six shares of voting common and the bulk of the
equity in nonvoting preferred stock, where it was the voting shares which
were transferred into trust, and where the decedent-donor was one of three
trustees with express power to vote the shares. Since the only value of the
common shares was contained in their ability to control the business, reten-
tion of that control by the donor, even as trustee, would appear to be a
retention of the only possible "enjoyment" of the shares, even without refer-
ence to the 1976 amendment. As a result, the transaction should not have
been excluded from the coverage of section 2036 on the basis of
Byrum.1 1 6 Indeed, withholding control of an asset whose only value is con-
trol is far different from retaining for control assets whose major value is
found in corporate equity as was true in Byrum. In the former case the
retention is directed primarily against the value purportedly transferred
while in the latter it is not. That one may more easily discern a testamentary
purpose in the former instance is clear.
Finally, one can contrast Gilman with a case such as Estate of Harry H.
Beckwith. 117 There, the decedent retained voting power by means of mak-
ing himself trustee of the trust to which he transferred his shares. This
power, coupled with proxies regularly given him by other shareholders, gave
him control over the corporation. Since the power was held only as trustee
or as the result of transfers of others, the decedent's estate would properly
not include the value of the trust shares under Byrum. Even with respect to
shares that he had transferred, voting power held as a trustee illustrates only
a desire to perform normal trustee activities and cannot, by itself, be taken
as an indication of a reservation counter to the interests of the beneficiaries.
excluded from the decedent's gross estate), and Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242
(1970) (voting rights of closely held corporation's stock held as trustee and as proxy not sufficient
to require inclusion in the gross estate under section 2036 because no express or implied
agreement could be inferred which would restrict the trustees' freedom either in voting or
disposing of the stock), acquiesced in, 1971-2 C.B. 1, noted in 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 681. New-
man & Kalter, Transfers of Corporate Securities by Persons in Control of Corporate Policy, 111
TRUSTS & EsT. 118 (1972).
115. 65 T.C. 296 (1975), aff'd, 547 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the effect of
Gilman, see Pressment, Effect of Tax Court's Gilman Decision on Estate Planning For the
Close Corporation, 44 J. TAx. 160 (1976).
116. For a contrary view, see 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 950 (1972).
117. 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971-2 C.B. 1. See note 114 supra.
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With the amendment to section 2036, the question in Beckwith may be
somewhat closer, although the result should be similar. Technically, the
transfer of stock to a trust carries with it voting rights, so that the rights are
not "retained" in a classic sense. Even assuming that such a transfer would
be held to comprehend a "retention," "18 there still is a question whether
voting rights held by a trustee as legal owner of the stock would be held to
constitute a "right to vote" the stock under the amendment. Voting rights
form a part of the ownership interest in stock. Unless they are severed from
other ownership rights, it is difficult analytically to say that the trustee has a
right to vote the stock rather than mere ownership of it. As a result,
Beckwith may well not illustrate a forbidden transaction under either Byrum
or the amendment to section 2036.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the amendment to section 2036 included by Congress in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Byrum remains a significant decision. In addition to
helping expose the fundamental inquiry under section 2036-whether or not
the transaction in question was, upon an objective analysis of the cir-
cumstances, "'intended to take effect . .. at .. . death"--the result reached
by the Court recognizes that the concept of "testamentariness" can easily be
a double-edged sword. Whether the judicial realism of these basic principles
will survive the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and decisions which rely heavily
upon the Court's technical reasoning such as Goodwyn and Gilman is a
question which only time can answer.
118. See United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
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